INTRODUCTION
The conditions of treatment of forensic patients-their institutionalization in psychiatric facilities, their confinement in such facilities, and their possible pathways out-has always been stunningly under-considered, not just in academic literature and case law, but also in the discussions and negotiations that led to the final draft of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ("CRPD").I In an important book written about the "back story" of the negotiations, the role of Non-Governmental Organizations ("NGO"), and the back-and-forth that led to the CRPD's promulgation, there is virtually no mention of the specific and unique issues that are raised by the institutionalization of forensic patients. 2 Nor is there any mention whatsoever of the multiple routes that lead to individuals' entering such facilities-some because they are currently seen as incompetent to stand trial, some because they have been deemed permanently incompetent to stand trial, some because they are being evaluated after having filed notice of seeking to plead the insanity defense, some because they have been found not guilty by reason of insanity, and, in some nations, some because they have been transferred after 480 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:477 These Comments have been embraced by some members of the disability-rights community, " and the abolitionist movement is growing.
1 7 This position is wrongheaded in every possible way. If adopted, it will make a mockery of any modicum of fair-trial rights for the population in question, and will likely lead to torture of this population in the jails and prisons in which it will languish." The statement in the GCs-"that declarations of unfitness to stand trial and the detention of persons based on that declaration is contrary to article 14 of the [CRPD] since it deprives the person of his or her right to due process and safeguards that are applicable to every defendant" 9 -is the single most wrongheaded (and potentially destructive) statement uttered by any supporter of the CRPD since its initial drafting. 19. CRPD, Statement on Article 14, supra note 13. 20. Before I became a professor, I spent thirteen years as a lawyer representing persons with mental disabilities, including three years during which my focus was primarily on such individuals charged with crimes. In this role, when I was deputy public defender in Mercer County (Trenton), New Jersey, I represented several hundred individuals at New Jersey's "maximum security hospital for the criminally insane," both in individual cases and in a class action, Dixon v. Cahill, which implemented the then-recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). See supra note 10. Jackson had declared unconstitutional a state policy that allowed for the indefinite commitment of a pretrial detainee in maximum-security forensic facilities if it was unlikely that he would regain his capacity to stand trial in the "foreseeable future." I continued to represent this population for a decade in my later positions as director of the New Jersey Division of Mental Health Advocacy and Special Counsel to the New Jersey Public Advocate. Also, as a public defender, I represented, at trial, many defendants who were incompetent to stand trial and others who, although competent, pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. See generally, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Mental Patient Advocacy by a Public Advocate, 54 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 169 (1982) . Finally, during the time that I directed the Federal Litigation Clinic at New York Law School, I filed a brief on behalf of appellant (amicus Committee on the Fundamental Rights and Equality ofEx-Patients) inAke v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (finding right of indigent defendant to independent psychiatrist to aid in presentation of insanity defense).
These experiences gave me, I think, a unique perspective on the issues at hand. There is no question that the conditions in which these individuals were housed were horrific-they shocked the conscience and were about as counter-therapeutic as one could imagine. But to think that the best remedy was to abolish the only realistic hope they had to avoid the even-more-brutal conditions of state prison is, to me, bizarre. It is even more bizarre since, to the best of my knowledge, none of the commentary that I discuss in this paper even considers the reality that raising the incompetency status is in no way a concession of factual guilt. See Michael L. Perlin 246 (2004) [hereinafter Perlin, Upside Down] ("Although there is nothing in the invocation of the incompetency status that at all concedes factual guilt ... it is assumed by all that the defendant did, in fact, commit the crime.").
factually innocent people will be convicted and imprisoned, 2 1 likely for far longer than persons without mental disabilities for like offenses. 22 Also, factually guilty defendants will be robbed of their opportunities to make important choices such as choosing to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter into a plea bargain. 23 This Article argues that the interpretations of the GCs ignore the rest of the CRPD and other prevailing international human-rights law, make no theoretical or conceptual sense, disregard the history of how society has treated persons with serious mental disabilities who are charged with crimes, and will lead to torture of this population in prison, at the hands of both prison guards and other prisoners. This position also contradicts every precept of therapeutic jurisprudence ("TJ"). 24 In his thoughtful piece that seeks to integrate the traditional insanity-defense standards with other criminal-law defenses like mistake of fact or duress, Professor Christopher Slobogin notes how " [t] he category of 'criminal insanity' perpetuates the extremely damaging myth that people with mental disability are especially dangerous or especially lacking in self-control." 2 5 He cites an article I wrote about
21.
See infra text accompanying note 75 (noting that incompetency is a status, not a defense, and that raising it is in no way a concession of factual guilt). Defendants, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 439, 445 (1983) (stating that unsuccessful insanity pleaders were institutionalized 22% longer than those who never raised the plea)) (discussing how defendants who unsuccessfully pleaded insanity-thus raising their mental-health status to the fact finder-served significantly longer sentences than defendants convicted of like charges who did not proffer an insanity defense); see also DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 644-45 (1990) (stating that research into 128 Georgia capital cases in 1990 revealed that an unsuccessful insanity defense strongly correlated with a sentence of death). Such an unsuccessful defense may also thwart a defendant's attempts to seek sentencing reduction under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See James Gusfa & Maya Prabhu, Sentencing Adjustment Following an Unsuccessful Insanity Defense, 43 J. AM. (discussing United States v. Herriman, 739 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2014 PROFESSION 45 (2000) . Its ultimate aim is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and roles for lawyers can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due-process principles. See, e.g [hereinafter Slobogin, Eliminating Mental Disability] . I agree with Slobogin that the entire way the insanity defense is perceived and discussed in the public arena perpetuates these sanist myths. I believe it is not the defense but rather the empirically and what I call "sanism":26 "the pervasive stigma that befalls persons with mental disabilities." 27 I agree that sanism leads many to believe that insanity pleaders are somehow typical of all persons with mental disabilities. But, as I discuss extensively below, that same sanism will lead to disaster for this population if this status and defense are abolished. 2 8 Support of the abolitionist positions by portions of the disability-rightsadvocacy community exhibits a startling lack of understanding of the treatment of this population in prison settings. By obsessively focusing on only two articles of the CRPD, the abolitionist position ignores other articles of that CRPD that support the continuation of this defense and this status, 2 9 as well as other international human-rights conventions that speak to the right to a "fair trial."
See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 109 (1994) [hereinafter PERLIN,

INSANITY DEFENSE JURISPRUDENCE] (citing Jeraldine Braff, Thomas Arvanites & Henry J. Steadman, Detention Patterns of Successful and Unsuccessful Insanity
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 114 (2015)
30
Even if, under a tortured reading, one can assume that Article 12 can be read to support this position, consideration of it in the context of the rest of the Convention must lead us to reject this argument. The abolitionist position is shortsighted and, if adopted, would inevitably lead to a worsening of the lives of a segment of the population of persons with disabilities that has never been consulted in this conversation.
3 1 For example, Article 4(4) of the CRPD mandates that " [n] othing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions which are more conducive to the realization of the rights of persons with disabilities and which may be contained in the law of a State Party or international law in force for that State."
32 There is no mention of Article 4 in any of the literature that suggests that the CRPD requires the abolition of the insanity defense, the incompetency status, or both.
Finally, this proposal repudiates every tenet of TJ. Abolishing the incompetency status and the insanity defense deprives this population of authentic due process, participating in fair trials, and having a voice.
3 3 It may or may not be coincidental that one of the leaders of the CRPD-based movement to abolish these defenses is also on record as saying that TJ "is a concept to avoid." 3 4 This position must be rejected.
First, this Article will discuss the significance of the CRPD and why, when it is read as an integrated document, the interpretations in the GCs and the supporting literature must be unequivocally rejected.
Next, this Article will consider the singular role of the insanity defense and incompetency status in legal history. Here, this Article acknowledges that, while pleading insanity may sometimes be a bad option, it is still one that needs to be retained, and retention of the plea reinforces the reality that raising the incompetency status is not an admission of factual guilt.
3 6 Thus, trying a person who is unable to cooperate with her counsel, rationally understand the proceedings against her, or both, makes it more likely that she will be convicted of crimes of which she may not be guilty, a base and basic violation of human decency. This Article will then consider the GCs to Articles 12 and 14 that are at the center of this controversy, concluding that they make no conceptual sense. If implemented, they would violate due process, dignity, and fair-trial mandates, and would inevitably lead to the torture of persons with mental disabilities who are charged with and convicted of crimes. 37 This denouement is even more staggering when we realize that there is no indication that this outcome was ever in the minds of the drafters or was ever debated, or that the populations in question were ever consulted. This latter failure frontally mocks the precept of " [n] Finally, the abolition of the insanity defense and incompetency status violates every precept of TJ.
3 9 TJ sees three values as essential elements of the legal process: voice, validation, and voluntariness.
4 0 Elimination of the insanity defense and incompetency status makes it virtually impossible that these values will be privileged, and makes it more likely that sanist behavior on the part of jails, prison administrators, and line staff will fester to an even greater extent than it does now.
The title of this Article comes from Bob Dylan's brilliant song, Highway 61 Revisited.
4 1 I use it here because one of the most nettlesome subsets of insanitydefense cases flows from what are called "deific decree" cases, where an individual's psychotic delusion leads to a belief that he or she is acting under the direct command of God.
4 2 Consider the full verse, and update it to current times:
Oh God said to Abraham, "Kill me a son" Abe says, "Man, you must be puttin' me on" fear that the alleged reform of insanity-defense abolition will precisely lead to more "cruelty, sadism and destruction." I. THE CRPD Several years ago, in an article concluding that the CRPD required a total overhaul of the guardianship laws of all nations, I argued that this Convention "radically changes the scope of international human rights law as it applies to all persons with disabilities, and in no area is this more significant than in the area of mental disability law." 48 In that article, I described my vision of the CRPD:
The Convention. . . "is regarded as having finally empowered the 'world's largest minority' to claim their rights, and to participate in international and national affairs on an equal basis with others who have achieved specific treaty recognition and protection." [It] is the most revolutionary international human rights document ever created that applies to persons with disabilities.
[It] furthers the human rights approach to disability and recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in almost every aspect of life. It firmly endorses a social model of disability-a clear and direct repudiation of the medical model that traditionally was part-and-parcel of mental disability law. "The Convention responds to traditional models, situates disability within a social model framework, and sketches the full range of human rights that apply to all human beings, all with a particular application to the lives of persons with disabilities." It provides a framework for ensuring that mental health laws "fully recognize the rights of those with mental illness." There is no question that it has "ushered in a new era of disability rights policy. Scholars have made persuasive arguments that these rights apply to trials of alleged international war criminals; 5 6 it is unthinkable to make a persuasive argument that they do not apply to persons with mental disabilities. As I will discuss more extensively below, it demeans any notion of dignity-one of the foundational rights of the CRPD-to deprive persons with mental disabilities the right to plead insanity, or to force them to trial if they are not competent to consult with counsel or understand the proceedings against them.
5 " It also flies in the face of nearly seventy years of international human-rights law. 5 9
II. THE INCOMPETENCY STATUS AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A. Incompetency Status
Few principles are as firmly embedded in criminal jurisprudence as the doctrine that an "incompetent" defendant may not be put to trial.
6 0 The doctrine traces back to mid-seventeenth-century England, 1 with commentators generally focusing on:
(1) the incompetent defendant's inability to aid in his defense, 62 (2) the parallels to the historic ban on trials in absentia, 6 3 and (3) the parallels to the problems raised by defendants who refused to plead to the charges entered against them.
64
The primary purpose of the incompetency status was to "safeguard the accuracy of adjudication." 6 5 As early as 1899, a U.S. federal court of appeals held that it was "not 'due process of law' to subject an insane person to trial upon an indictment involving liberty or life." 6 6 Contemporaneously, the Tennessee Supreme Court 64. Until the late eighteenth century, if the court concluded that a defendant was remaining "mute of malice," it could order him to be subjected to the practice of peine forte et dure, the placing of increasingly heavy weights on the defendant's chest to "press" him for an answer. See, e.g suggested: "It would be inhumane, and to a certain extent a denial of the right of trial upon the merits, to require one who has been disabled by the act of God from intelligently making his defense to plead or be tried for his life or liberty." 6 7 It became black-letter law that the "trial and conviction of a person mentally and physically incapable of making a defense violates certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government."
6 " First, an incompetent defendant might alone have exculpatory information that he is incapable of transmitting to counsel.
69 Second, to try an incompetent defendant has been likened to permitting an adversary contest "in which the defendant, like a small boy being beaten by a bully, is unable to dodge or return the blows." 7 0 Third, it has been suggested that the trial of an incompetent defendant transforms the adversary process from "a reasoned interaction between an individual and his community" into "an invective against an insensible object." 7 1 Fourth, "it seems essential to the philosophy of punishment that the defendant know why he is being punished, and such comprehension is to a great extent dependent upon involvement with the trial itself." 7 2 Actions against incompetent defendants were decried over three centuries ago by Lord Coke as "a miserable spectacle, both against law, and of extreme inhumanity and cruelty, and can be no example to others."
The rationale of the incompetency status is clear. When is a person unfit to stand trial? (1) A person is unfit to stand trial for an offence if, because the person's mental processes are disordered or impaired, the person is or, at some time during the trial, will be-(a) unable to understand the nature of the charge; or (b) unable to enter a plea to the charge and to exercise the right to challenge jurors or the jury; or It also needs to be stressed that incompetency is a status, not a defense, and raising it is in no way a concession of factual guilt like invocation of the insanity defense. The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice underscore that the doctrine of incompetence to stand trial "has no bearing on guilt or innocence." 7 However, "[a]lthough there is nothing in the invocation of the incompetency status that at all concedes factual guilt . . . it is assumed by all that the defendant did, in fact, commit the crime."
Competency determinations are not easy ones to make. The Supreme Court acknowledged this in Drope v. Missouri:
[E]vidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry is required, but . . . even one of these factors standing alone may, in some circumstances, be sufficient. There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.
But there is no question that the trial of a person who has been found to be incompetent violates every basic tenet of due process.
7 9 Any reform that makes it more likely that there will be an increase in such trials must be rejected out of hand.
(c) unable to understand the nature of the trial (namely that it is an inquiry as to whether the person committed the offence); or (d) unable to follow the course of the trial; or (e) unable to understand the substantial effect of any evidence that may be given in support of the prosecution; or (f) unable to give instructions to his or her legal practitioner. (2) A person is not unfit to stand trial only because he or she is suffering from memory loss. 
Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to
Id.
77. Perlin, Upside Down, supra note 20, at 246. It should be noted that in some other jurisdictions (e.g., Queensland, Australia), raising unfitness means that there is no examination of the alleged facts and that the defendant will automatically be detained or supervised as though she had committed the underlying crime. See, e.g., Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) ch 7 pt 7 div 1 s 288(1) (Austl.). The Mental Health Court, to which criminal cases are transferred if mental health is an issue, may or must make a forensic order for the person's detention for involuntary treatment if the person:
(a) was of unsound mind when the alleged offence was committed; or (b) is unfit for trial for the alleged offence and the unfitness for trial is of a permanent nature; or (c) is unfit for trial for the alleged offence and the unfitness for trial is not of a permanent nature. In this context, it is helpful to consider the Supreme Court's decision in Indiana v. Edwards.so There, the Court grappled with the question of when a trial court could override a mentally-ill-but-competent-to-stand-trial criminal defendant's wishes to represent himself pro se. The Court held that the Constitution permits states to insist upon representation by counsel for those who are competent enough to stand trial but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point that they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.
Id. (emphasis added). A forensic order is mandatory for those in category (c
1 In coming to this conclusion, the Court carefully distinguished its earlier decision in Godinez v. Moran 82 -which held that the standard for competency to stand trial, waive counsel, and plead guilty were identical-noting that Godinez did not deal with this specific question. In explaining the rationale of its decision, the Court employed concepts inherent to procedural justice:
Mental illness itself is not a unitary concept. It varies in degree. It can vary over time. It interferes with an individual's functioning at different times in different ways. The history of this case . . . illustrates the complexity of the problem. In certain instances an individual may well be able to satisfy Dusky's mental competence standard, for he will be able to work with counsel at trial, yet at the same time he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel. with an "uncertain mental state, the spectacle that could well result from his self-representation at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating as ennobling."
The Court found that proceedings must not only be fair; they must "appear fair to all who observe them." This focus on dignity and the perception of justice, in addition to being the Court's "first implicit endorsement of important principles of therapeutic jurisprudence91 in a criminal procedure context,"92 is central to this Article's thesis: how can our legal system allow a person who did not have the "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding [or] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him" 93 to go to trial?
B. Insanity Defense
I have been writing about the insanity defense for forty-five years, both in international 94 and domestic 95 contexts.
96 I concede that U.S. insanity-defense jurisprudence is often incoherent, 97 but this sad reality in no way minimizes, in my mind, the critical role it plays in any criminal-justice system that is fundamentally fair. As I will discuss below, discarding it would disregard millennia of experience and violate the most basic concepts of due process. Few areas of our legal system have engendered as intense debate as the role of the insanity defense in the criminal-justice process. 98 On the one hand, this "difficult subject" is seen as a reflection of "the fundamental moral principles of our criminal law." 99 It rests on "assumptions that are older than the Republic" 1 00
satisfying the Dusky standard, was still mentally ill -attempt to conduct his own trial: "[H]ow in the world can our legal system allow an insane man to defend himself?" Id. (alteration in original).
91.
See infra text accompanying notes 237-47.
92
. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 13-2.4. This endorsement can be juxtaposed with Justice Scalia's dissent, suggesting that the majority view is sanist (as the decision "permits [defendants with mental disabilities] to be deprived of a basic constitutional right-for their own good," Edwards, 554 U.S. at 189 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and thus opening up a question that has not been paid that much attention in the post-Godinez years: Is it more sanist to deprive persons with mental disabilities of a right that all other citizens have (i.e., that of self-representation) or to allow such persons to represent themselves in trials that may be nothing more than charades? See Michael L. 243 (5th Cir. 1984) .
100. See Lyons, 739 F.2d at 995 (Rubin, J., dissenting) (citing HALE ET AL., supra note 62).
and on "beliefs about human rationality, deterrability, and free will";o and it serves as a bulwark of the law's "moorings of condemnation for moral failure." 10 2
As stated by an Ohio court, "the insanity defense goes to the very root of our criminal justice system." 1 0 3 On the other hand, the insanity defense is attacked on the basis of a series of myths that have been firmly and conclusively disproved by all the valid and reliable statistical and empirical evidence. 10 4 Notwithstanding the insanity defense's relative numerical insignificance, 1 0 5 it is rooted in moral principles of excuse that are accepted "in both ordinary human interaction and criminal law,"
1 o 6 and it continues to serve as a "surrogate for resolution of the most profound issues in criminal justice." 1 0 7 As Professor Susan Bandes has suggested, "[t]he evolution of the insanity defense represents a continuing struggle to incorporate expanding medical knowledge into our system of laws."os Historically, the defense has been "a major component of the Anglo-American common law for over 700 years." 1 09 Rooted in Talmudic, Greek, and Roman history, its forerunners can actually be traced back over 3000 years. 110 The sixth-century Code of Justinian explicitly recognized that the "insane" were not responsible for their acts."' By the ninth century, the "Dooms of Alfred" 1 2 acknowledged that an impaired individual who could not "acknowledge or confess his offences" was absolved from personally making restitution. -but it is clear that even prior to that case, juries considered "acquittal to be the appropriate result" in certain insanity-defense cases.
1 15 Further, William Lambard's late-sixteenth-century text on criminal responsibility' 1 6 suggested that the insanity defense was already "well settled" in England,' 1 7 and Sir Coke's 1817 treatise "gave the law the familiar maxim that 'a madman is only punished by his madness."' 1 1 8 In short, the defense has been a part of the fabric of the law since "time immemorial."
C. The Indispensability of the Incompetency Status and Insanity Defense
As this brief historical overview should make clear, both the incompetency status and the insanity defense are indispensable segments of a mature and coherent legal system. It is true that a handful of U.S. states have abolished the insanity defense, 1 1 9 but clearly there must be at least a mens rea exception.120
Importantly, commentators have been uniformly critical of the abolitionist states. One critic of Kansas's law said:
Kansas's mens rea approach is not a satisfactory alternative to the former insanity defense. Even though the approach is relatively simple and straightforward when compared to M'Naghten, it is too narrow in its application. It unfairly punishes people who are completely unable to understand the nature If a mad man or a naturall foole, or a lunatike in the time of his lunacie, or a childe y apparently hath no knowledge of good nor euil do kill a ma, this is no felonious acte, nor any thing forfeited by it ... for they cannot be said to haue any understanding wil. But if upo examinatio it fal out, y they knew what they did, & y it was ill, the seemth it to be otherwise. and consequences of their actions. Our criminal justice system has been premised on the belief that only people who are responsible for their actions should be punished.121
The General Comment rejects this bedrock premise of the criminal justice, allegedly in support of universal capacity. Nothing could be more misguided.
III. THE GENERAL COMMENT
Nearly two decades ago, I wrote this in an article about the "borderlines" around the insanity defense that needed to be considered:
I believe that the insanity defense has always been a symbol and a screen. It has always served as a litmus test for how we feel about a host of social, political, cultural and behavioral issues that far transcend the narrow questions of whether a specific defendant should be held responsible for what-on its surface-is a criminal act, or how responsibility should be legally calibrated, or of the sort of institution in which a successful insanity acquittee should be housed.
At its base, how we feel about the insanity defense illuminates how we feel about the relationships between mental health and the law, between mental health professionals and judges, between criminals and victims, between the media and the trial process, between the law-abiding and the law-flaunting. In short, our feelings about the insanity defense reflect our feelings about borderlines .... 123 Let us start with the question of incompetency. The Comment on Article 14 begins: "Liberty and security of the person is one of the most precious rights to which everyone is entitled. In particular, all persons with disabilities, and especially persons with mental disabilities or psychosocial disabilities are entitled to liberty pursuant to article 14 of the Convention." 1 2 4 This is certainly one of the foundational CRPD rights. But the Comment moves from there to the call to abolish the incompetency status. In a section headed "Detention of persons unfit to plead in criminal justice systems," the Comment states: "The committee has established that declarations of unfitness to stand trial and the detention of persons based on that declaration is contrary to article 14 of the convention since it deprives the 
130.
As noted, supra text accompanying note 70, over 200 years ago, a court noted that to allow an incompetent defendant to be tried is like permitting an adversary contest "in which the defendant, like a small boy being beaten by a bully, is unable to dodge or return the blows." Ausness, supra note 65, at 669. suffer from severe mental illness to the point that they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.
13 2 Such self-representation at trial will not "affirm the dignity" of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel.
13 3 The trial of an incompetent defendant mocks any definition of dignity, 13 4 one of the basic tenets of the CRPD.
3 5
Third, even assuming there is any textual support within Article 14 for this tortured reading, it is black-letter law that any piece of legislation must be read in pari materia.136 It is axiomatic that a statute "must, to the extent possible, ensure that the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent."l37 Consider again other articles of the CRPD: mandating "[r]espect for inherent dignity"; 1 38 "[f]reedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"; 1 39 "[fireedom from exploitation, violence and abuse"; 14 0 a right to protection of the "integrity of the person"; 14 1 and the retention of any provisions "more conducive to the ... rights of persons with disabilities." 1 4 2 Any interpretation of Article 14 that makes it more likely that factually innocent individuals will be convicted and incarcerated and that makes it less likely that the individual's trial will be "fair" must be rejected.
Turn now to the insanity defense. Criminal Court. 145 As I have often noted in other contexts, I believe that abolition is wrongheaded, counterproductive, and likely a violation of due process. 14 6
Twenty years ago, I charged that "[t]he intellectual vacuity among politicallymotivated abolitionists is illuminated by the striking lack of interest that has been shown in the empirical data in those jurisdictions where abolition has been attempted." 1 4 7 I have also argued that the abolition movement has been fueled by the "common wisdom" 1 48 that the insanity defense is an abused, over-pleaded, and over-accepted loophole used as a last-gasp plea solely in grisly murder cases to thwart the death penalty; that most successful pleaders are not truly mentally ill; that most acquittals follow sharply contested "battles of the experts"; and that most successful pleaders are sent for short stays to civil hospitals. 149 Although each of these myths has been clearly, definitively, and empirically disproved, 1 5 0 all of them remain powerful and show no sign of abating.
1 5 1 The abolitionist movement has been fueled by politicians who focus on abolition as a panacea for urban crime problems, 15 2 and legislative candidates point to insanity-defense support as indicia of an opponent's being soft on crime. 153 Professor Stephen Morse has concluded that "[w]e should not abolish the insanity defense unless we truly believe that every perpetrator of a criminal act deserves to be punished, no matter how crazy."l54
But these abolitionist arguments pale in comparison with the Comment on Article 12 that reads the CRPD to purportedly demand the abolition of the defense in all signatory nations. 155 According to that Comment:
In the area of criminal law, recognition of the legal capacity of persons with disabilities requires abolishing a defence based on the negation of criminal responsibility because of the existence of a mental or intellectual disability. 148. This "common wisdom" is an exemplar of what I refer to as false "ordinary common sense" ("OCS"), which has contaminated insanity-defense jurisprudence. In short, Slobogin-although recommending the elimination of the insanity defense per se-endorses a finding of non-culpability in certain cases. He would thus find a defendant not to be culpable if the defendant claimed, for example, "I shot him because it was necessary to save the world from destruction by the Klingon empire" (duress and mistake of fact), or, "I shot him because God [or the devil] 1 6 0 told me to" (mistake of fact and, of course, a parallel to the biblical story of Abraham and his son, as dramatized in the Bob Dylan song that gave this Article its title). This is an insanity defense but is merely not characterized by Slobogin as such. It must also be noted that in some jurisdictions, duress is not allowed as a defense to homicide; 1 6 1 in those jurisdictions, presumably, Slobogin's formulation would not be allowed.
Slobogin has relied, in part, on my many discussions of sanism and how it poisons all jurisprudence, in support of his position that the insanity defense must be recast, noting that "[o]ne particularly insidious sanist notion, clearly belied by the data, is that those with mental illness are abnormally dangerous." 1 6 2 I agree certainly, but I do not see this observation as requiring abolition of the insanity defense. First, there is no causal correlation between the use of the insanity defense and an underlying dangerous crime.
16 3 My research indicates that a victim died in only a minority of cases in which the insanity defense was pleaded.
1 64 Second, the assertion of an insanity defense need not necessarily lead to subsequent long-term institutionalization.
1 6 5 Also, if the evidence that is developed shows that a [Vol. 54:477 defendant committed a certain act to save us from the Klingon empire or because God (or the devil) ordained it, the jurors should logically conclude that the defendant has a profound mental illness. I cannot believe that saying this mental illness is part of a mistake-of-fact or duress defense will somehow diminish juror sanism.
Beyond semantics, I disagree with Slobogin on two points. First, he discusses the famous case of John Hinckley, the man who shot President Ronald Reagan and was subsequently found not guilty by reason of insanity. out that Hinckley would not have had a defense under his scheme, concluding that the lack-of-appreciation and inability-to-conform prongs 1 6 " of the insanitydefense test under which Hinckley was tried were "overbroad." 1 6 9 I disagree, as I believe that the ALI-MPC test-employed at that time in the federal district of the District of Columbia, where Hinckley was tried-was the appropriate test and was, if anything, too narrow.
But, more importantly, I believe that Hinckley's acquittal flowed not from the wording of the test but rather from two other sources: (1) how the jurors perceived the expert witnesses in Hinckley's case (finding the defendant's witnesses more trustworthy and believable); 1 7 1 and, more importantly, (2) under federal law at the time Hinckley was tried, once insanity was raised, the burden of proof shifted to the government to disprove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
17 2 This burden was changed by the Insanity Defense Reform Act ("IDRA") in 1984,173 and I have serious doubts as to whether Hinckley would have any chance of being acquitted had the burden of proof required by the IDRA been in place. 174 In short, it was not the use of the "expansive" substantive so-called "Brawner test" 1 7 5 that led to the not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity ("NGRI") verdict in Hinckley's case, but rather the more generous burden of proof.
1 7 6 The other point to make here is that the The burden is on the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that the defendant was not suffering from a mental disease or defect on March 30, 1981, or else that he nevertheless had substantial capacity on that date both to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. 
175.
See supra note 168 and accompanying text. On the differences between the Brawner test and the M'Naghten test, see PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 89-9 1.
But see GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 218 (1987)
(questioning the significance of the burden of proof). It is impossible, of course, to pinpoint exactly why a jury chose to decide a case as it did, and there were other potential confounders here as well (e.g., the defense's use of then-nascent neuroscientific evidence; and the racial composition of the jury, see generally CAPLAN, supra note 107, at 127), but, certainly, the verdict in the Hinckley case was a major motivating force to include the change in burden in the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984. Committee is of the view that a more rigorous requirement than proof by a preponderance of the evidence is necessary to assure that only those defendants who plainly satisfy the requirements of the defense are exonerated [Vol. 54:477 history of the insanity defense in the United States is one of persons with legitimate insanity defenses being convicted by jurors in the face of overwhelming evidence of insanity, not the specter of non-insane defendants being acquitted.
The defense is, and always has been, underutilized.
1 78 I fear that Slobogin's formulation would lead to a greater underutilization.
My second concern with Slobogin's formulation relates to the defense's potential unavailability to a defendant who "cause[d]" his mental state by "purposely avoiding treatment." 1 7 9 I fear that, if accepted, this caveat could be used broadly and bluntly to suppress the right to refuse the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication, a right that is otherwise protected by the CRPD as well as by domestic law.
18 0 Perhaps the Supreme Court's broadest statement in support of the right to refuse came in the case of Riggins v. Nevada,"" applying the right in the case of a competent defendant at his insanity-defense trial. 1 8 2 It is significant that the valid and reliable research shows us that jurors believe that defendants who refuse effective medication or therapy are responsible for their impaired mental state at the time of the offense and are therefore blameworthy for their crimes, regardless of what constitutional or statutory provisions may be in place in a jurisdiction at that time.
18 3 I fear that Slobogin's formulation would greatly diminish the constitutional scope of the right to refuse. 
The assumption that the defense is overused is flatly wrong:
A broad-based examination of insanity defense cases demonstrates, beyond any doubt, that when jurors err, they are globally more likely to commit the error of the false negative: overwhelmingly, they reject the insanity defense in cases of defendants who authentically should have been found to have met the standard for criminal nonresponsibility.
Perlin, Neonaticide, supra note 177, at 18. The insanity defense is used in, at the most, 1% of felony cases, and is successful about 25% of the time. PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 108. 179. Slobogin, Eliminating Mental Disability, supra note 25, at 306 (quoting SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE, supra note 159, at 56). It is significant, I think, that Slobogin bracketed this phrase, most likely reflecting, in his own mind, an ambivalence as to whether this portion of his formula would be accepted as part of a new definition. Slobogin points out that the "purposely avoiding treatment" language 1 "would not afford a person with mental disability an excuse if the impairments that led to a lack of mens rea or a belief that force was necessary were caused by the person's failure to sustain mental health treatment."' 1 6 But, as this language is in the disjunctive, it would also control the case of a person charged with a nonviolent offense lacking in mens rea. Beyond this, Slobogin cites to the well-accepted doctrine that one cannot plead a defense if one caused the condition of one's excuse, using the examples of "abus[ing] psychoactive substances or knowingly plac[ing] themselves in harm's way.""" But there is a world of difference-both legal difference and "real life" difference-between these examples and the example of one who wishes to assert an otherwise constitutionally protected right to refuse the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medications. 18 capacity to be held accountable for harm done to others or to the community [is] a corollary of the capacity to exercise rights, assume obligations and create legal relationships." 1 92 She concludes that the insanity defense is contrary to Article 12 of the CRPD "because it undermines the equal recognition of persons with disabilities before the law as individuals with mutual obligations towards others and an equal right to participate in defining and negotiating those obligations. "193 I agree with Minkowitz that the insanity defense, as currently utilized, is often "legally and socially stigmatizing," that insanity acquittals often do not result in release from custody, and that insanity acquittees are often held in forensic facilities for longer than is warranted by the underlying crimes with which they were charged. 194 And I agree fully that, historically, many of those who have been found not guilty by reason of insanity were the victims of grossly inadequate counsel.
1 95 The example of Michael Jones, who was locked up for decades following an insanity acquittal on a charge of attempted shoplifting, 196 is one of the saddest examples of this reality. But to say that these realities should lead us to abolish the insanity defense not only throws out the baby with the bathwater, but also throws out the tub and the entire plumbing system as well. I support the insanity defense because I believe that exculpation of some individuals based on mental state is essential to a mature and coherent system of criminal law. It is not the insanity defense that causes the abuses that Minkowitz correctly catalogues, but rather the administration of the post-insanity-defense-acquittal case disposition and institutionalization system. 198 That is where our attention should be focused.
By way of example, Carole Petersen, noting that it is doubtful that legislatures would ever accept Minkowitz's (or even Slobogin's) position, 1 99 thoughtfully argues that it would be "more prudent to propose reforms to the current defenses, providing stronger safeguards and more regular review of detention orders for defendants who are either deemed unfit for trial or relied upon disability-based defenses." 2 0 0 The Krol case, in New Jersey, gives us a blueprint as to how these reviews can and should take place. 20 1 It is a tragedy that this blueprint has not been embraced by other jurisdictions.
I have found little in Minkowitz's work that deals with the reality that I think we all must focus on in this discussion: what will happen to this cadre of defendants if there is no insanity defense? Elsewhere, Minkowitz does note her opposition to the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. These Rules are a non-binding declaration that has been widely used as an international normative standard for prison management and policy, and that provides that "persons who are found to be insane shall not be detained in prisons and arrangements shall be made to remove them to mental institutions as soon as possible," noting that "the disability community and the Special Rapporteur on Torture have urged deletion of this rule."
202 There are two important issues to consider. First, there is no evidence that "the disability community" as a whole is in agreement on this position. Second, there is no question in my mind that the immediate result of the abolition of the insanity defense would be the long-term incarceration of the population in question in prisons that we know are dangerous and life-threatening to this population.
3
A person may be legally sane in accordance with the instructions previously given and still yet, by reason of mental infirmity, have hallucinations or delusions which cause him to honestly believe to be facts things which are not true or real. The guilt of a person suffering from such hallucinations or delusions is to be determined just as though the hallucinations or delusions were actual facts. If the act of the defendant would have been lawful had the hallucinations or delusions been the actual facts, the defendant is not guilty of the crime. 
IV. TREATMENT OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES IN PRISONS
It is necessary to focus on what happens to persons with mental disabilities when they are imprisoned. A recent exhaustive report erases any shred of doubt that persons with mental disabilities are regularly brutalized and tortured in prison settings.
2 05 First, there is no dispute that "most jails and prisons do not conform to nationally accepted guidelines for mental health screening and treatment." 20 6 As a group, persons with mental disabilities are frequently and disproportionally the victims of violence and abuse inside correctional settings. 20 7 In this context, sexual victimization is a significant concern for incarcerated people, "particularly those with mental disabilities." 20 8 This is a reality that must be acknowledged in any conversation about the CRPD or the abolition of the insanity defense and incompetency status. In its report, "Callous and Cruel: Use of Force Against Inmates with Mental Disabilities in US Jails and Prisons," Human Rights Watch ("HRW") charged that jail and prison staff regularly use "unnecessary, excessive, or malicious . . . force against prisoners with mental disabilities." 2 0 9 The report concludes:
Corrections officials at times needlessly and punitively deluge them with chemical sprays; shock them with electric stun devices; strap them to chairs and beds for days on end; break their jaws, noses, ribs; or leave them with lacerations, second degree burns, deep bruises, and damaged internal organs. The violence can traumatize already vulnerable men and women, aggravating their symptoms and making future mental health treatment more difficult. In some cases, including several documented in this report, the use of force has caused or contributed to prisoners' deaths.
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Jamie Fellner, author of the report and U.S. program senior adviser at HRW, concludes that such facilities "can be dangerous, damaging, and even deadly places for men and women with mental health problems." 2 1 1 The report identified policies and practices that led to unwarranted force, based on a review of hundreds of individual court cases, class-action cases, and Justice Department investigations, and based on interviews with more than 125 current and former corrections officials, use-of-force experts, psychiatrists, and prisoner advocates. This report offers multiple recommendations: (1) public officials should reduce the number of prisoners with mental disabilities confined in prisons and jails, including by increasing the availability of community mental-health resources and access to criminal-justice diversion programs; (2) officials should also improve mental-health services in prisons and jails and ensure that correctional facilities adopt and follow sound policies on using force that consider the unique needs and vulnerabilities of prisoners with mental illness; 2 13 and (3) officials should use training to enforce these policies and include mechanisms for holding accountable staff who violate them.
14
These recommendations should not be surprising to anyone who follows developments in this area. At the outset, "there is no evidence that prisoners with psychiatric disabilities are receiving constitutionally adequate treatment. 571 (2015) . This is to say not that all these prisoners should have been found not guilty by reason of insanity (though, certainly, some should have, see sources cited supra note 151), but rather that the elimination of the insanity defense will make this wretched situation even worse. imprisoned.
2 23 Half of all prison suicides are committed by persons with serious mental illness.
2 24 The abolition of the insanity defense and the incompetency status-leading directly to more persons with serious mental illnesses being imprisoned-will inevitably increase these abysmal rates.
This problem is not limited to the United States. The treatment of aboriginal individuals with mental disabilities in Australian prisons is a national scandal.
2 25 A significant number of aboriginal people with cognitive impairment are currently being held in maximum-security prisons, despite not having been convicted of or sentenced for a crime that would require them to be held in such facilities.
226
Studies of Canadian prisons indicate that heightened use of solitary confinement further isolates persons with mental disabilities.
22 7 Anyone who has worked "on the ground" in the general correctional setting knows that many guards believe that this cohort of defendants is merely feigning and manipulative, and those guards thus seek to punish them for "gaming the system."
2 28 This is another aspect of institutional sanism. REV. 439, 441 (2015) (applying "the logic of the juvenile justice system to argue for a separate justice system for severely mentally ill offenders"). Importantly, in a recent article, Professor David Katner argued persuasively that the presumption of competency regularly employed in the juvenile justice system should be abandoned and that the party seeking an adjudication should be responsible for establishing that the accused juvenile is in fact competent to stand trial. See On mental-health courts in general, see Michael Perlin, "There 
V. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
How does this all fit with therapeutic jurisprudence? 237 As TJ "asks us to look at law as it actually impacts people's lives" 238 and "focuses on the law's impact on emotional life and psychological well-being," 2 39 it forces us to look at the "real world" implications of the abolition arguments to determine whether such abolition would be consonant with TJ aims and aspirations.
The ultimate aim of TJ is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and roles for lawyers can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due-process principles.24 0 There is an inherent tension in this inquiry, but David Wexler clearly identifies how it must be resolved: the law's use of "mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge upon justice concerns."2" It is vital to keep in mind that "an inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil rights and civil liberties." 2 4 2 In its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance rights, and promote well-being, TJ has been described as "a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of law . . . a movement towards a more distinctly relational approach to the practice of law . . . which emphasise[s] psychological wellness Court's dictates in Jones v. United States are anti-therapeutic; 2 5 0 and (4) TJ principles must be more rigorously applied to issues involving post-acquittal institutionalization and community monitoring. We must rigorously apply TJ principles to each aspect of the insanity defense. We need to take what we learn from TJ to strip away sanist behavior, pretextual reasoning, and teleological decision-making from the insanity-defense process. This would enable us to confront the pretextual use of social-science data in an open and meaningful way. I have been critical of the ways that insanity acquittee release and recommitment hearings have been conducted on issues ranging from the lack of adequate counsel, to judges' perfunctory treatment of these matters, to the sanism and pretext reflected in the positions of prosecutors in their efforts to oppose lessening restraints or changing conditions of confinement or release.
25 3 But, as I noted above, it is not the insanity defense that causes these abuses, but rather the administration of the post-insanity-defense-acquittal case disposition and institu-251 tionalization system. So, if there is to be no insanity defense, then there will be no insanity-acquittal release and recommitment hearings, as the cohort of defendants in question will be in prison.
Scholars and practitioners, writing in the context of civil-commitment hearings, have argued that that process had great therapeutic potential, reasoning that such hearings are therapeutic because (1) they give patients an opportunity to present and hear evidence in a meaningful court procedure, 2 55 and (2) they can increase the likelihood that any subsequent hospitalization and treatment will be successful. cases involving insanity acquittees. But again, if the defense is abolished, then so are these hearings.
On the question of whether the defense is consonant with TJ principles, consider the words of the late Judge David Bazelon: "By declaring a small number not responsible, we emphasize the responsibility of all others who commit crimes." 2 58
Judge Bazelon concluded, in other words, that "the existence of the insanity defense gives coherence to the entire fabric of criminal sentencing." 2 5 9 By punishing defendants who are not responsible, "we diminish all the rationales for punishment of the others whom we believe to be responsible for their crimes." 2 60
Indeed, in Clark v. Arizona, 2 61 which held that a state's insanity test that was couched solely in terms of capacity to tell whether an act is right or wrong did not violate due process, 2 62 the Supreme Court came perilously close to condoning the punishment of such non-responsible defendants. In criticizing that decision, I have said:
Almost 25 years ago, Judge David Bazelon, writing in the American Psychologist, argued that the courts should "open the courthouse doors" to mental health professionals, warning that they should "never hand over the keys."
263
They may now not be slammed shut, but it is fair to say that after Clark, Judge Bazelon's dreams have now been, for the foreseeable future, dashed.
264
Certainly, the abolition of the insanity defense would both slam the door shut and throw away the key. This becomes even more crucial when we consider the ways that individuals with mental disabilities are treated in prisons. The description of an expert witness in a prison double-celling case from twenty-five years ago-noting that "doublecelling" inmates with mental disabilities with non-disabled inmates in administrative segregation was a practice akin to "putting the chickens in the fox's The need to retain the incompetency status is even more pressing in the cases of criminal defendants with mental disabilities. Keri Gould, Deborah Dorfman, and I have concluded that " [t] he perception of receiving a fair hearing is therapeutic because it contributes to the individual's sense of dignity and conveys that he or she is being taken seriously." 268 A defendant who cannot cooperate with his counsel, who cannot understand the proceedings, will have no sense of dignity and will not be taken seriously by the finder of facts or anyone else in the courtroom. Tellingly, Minkowitz disparages TJ, alleging that it is "another variety of therapy to be imposed on the person without his or her free and informed consent." 2 6 9 There is not a shred of evidence in the TJ literature-indeed, she cites 270 none -supporting this position. Elsewhere, she argues that from the perspective of a psychiatric-abuse survivor, "it is a concept to avoid," claiming that it constitutes "handing over justice issues to professions (or even to a conceptual framework associated with those professions) that have repeatedly violated trust and perpetrated torture with drugs and electroshock and mind games of dominance and control."
I am utterly puzzled by this misstatement of what TJ is supposed to mean. There are those who wrap themselves in the mantle of TJ while acting in ways that are dissonant with TJ's principles and aspirations. There are certainly many judges who, seeing themselves as "adjunct therapists," inappropriately trample upon due-process rights in their quest to "do good." 2 7 2 I believe that the TJ community needs to be more vigilant in "calling out" such rogue behavior.
27 3 An excellent starting point is Professor Ida Dickie's discussion of how a TJ emphasis on procedural fairness and respect for autonomy can help all stakeholders in the criminal-justice system. (2008)). Professor Dickie concluded that "the broader implications of the TJ Model are that forensic psychologists may be able to practice within a legal system that respects an interdisciplinary and psychologically oriented approach to the management of criminal behavior." Dickie, supra, at 460-61. In the same vein, the TJ community needs to focus on the connection between TJ and international human-rights law.
2 7 5 I have called on TJ scholars to immerse themselves in international human-rights law and have listed ten topics on which they might focus their research. 276 One of these was an investigation of " [t] he TJ implications of instituting reform of forensic facilities." 2 77 There is an array of scholarship on the relationship between TJ and prisons and other detention facilities, 2 78 but there is still perilously little on this topic. This is an area that calls for new investigations and considerations.
9
All these problems are exacerbated by the pervasive ineffectiveness of counsel in cases involving defendants with mental disabilities in the criminal-justice system. 28 0 In an article about the role of counsel in insanity and incompetency cases, I listed multiple issues that, from a TJ perspective, needed additional focus.
28 1 Consider this list, and think about the implications of what happens to this population in prison settings where, in some nations, its access to lawyers will be far less than it is even in forensic hospitals: 279. I emphatically disbelieve that the retention of the insanity defense and incompetency status will bring about a more humane correctional system. I believe that their abolition will make an inhumane system even more inhumane.
280. See, e.g factual understanding of the proceedings against him;" how can TJ principles be invoked in such a case? * If a defendant is initially found to be incompetent to stand trial, will the lawyer act as most lawyers and consider him to be defacto incompetent for the entire proceeding (as a significant percentage of lawyers do act for any client who is institutionalized)? * If a defendant is found to be incompetent to stand trial, will the lawyer assume that he is also guilty of the underlying criminal charge? * What are the issues that a lawyer must consider in addition to the client's mental state in assessing whether or not to invoke an incompetency determination? * What are the TJ implications for a case in which the incompetency status is not raised by the defendant, but, rather, by the prosecutor or the judge? * Are there times when TJ principles might mandate not raising the incompetency status (for example, in a case in which the maximum sentence to which the defendant is exposed is six months in a county workhouse but is in a jurisdiction in which IST defendants are regularly housed in maximum security forensic facilities for far longer periods of time than the maximum to which they could be sentenced)? * What are the TJ implications of counseling a defendant to plead, or not to plead, the insanity defense? * Can a defendant who pleads NGRI ever, truly, "take responsibility?" * Does the fact that the insanity-pleading defendant must concede that he committed the actus reus distort the ongoing lawyer-client relationship? * To what extent do the ample bodies of case law construing the "ineffective assistance of counsel" standard established by the US Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington283 even consider the implications of TJ lawyering? * To what extent does the pervasiveness of sanism make it obligatory for lawyers in such cases to educate jurors about both sanism and why sanism may be driving their decision-making, and to what extent should lawyers in such cases embark on this educational process using TJ principles? 2 8 4 I believe that TJ requires a robust and expansive insanity defense. 2 8 5 It demands a reconsideration of policies that punish defendants for raising the defense, reject testimony as to the causal relation between mental disability and the commission of otherwise-criminal acts, and incarcerate "successful" insanity pleaders in maximum-security forensic institutions for far longer than the maximum sentence for the underlying crime, which is often a trivial one. , 419-37 (discussing how TJ can be employed to "make our insanity defense system coherent").
286. TJ is also, in my view, the only option for changing the culture that condones the brutal treatment of mentally ill defendants in prison settings.
I am convinced, after spending over forty years representing and working closely with persons with serious mental disabilities in the criminal-justice system, that it is the only way that we can begin to eradicate the poison of sanism that contaminates our criminal-justice system.
CONCLUSION
The issues that I discuss here have been addressed collaterally over the years, in the context of arguments that seek to abolish involuntary civil commitment. have never embraced those arguments, as appealing as they are on so many levels, because of my fears that a large number of persons now subject to commitment would be arrested and jailed on minor "quality of life" offenses.
28 8 Over thirty years ago, in his response to Professor Stephen Morse's then-position that commitment should be abolished, 28 9 Andrew Scull wrote that "while Morse may not balk at the prospect of sending the mentally ill to prison, a . .. system of justice built around the concept of criminal responsibility almost certainly will." 2 90 I echo Scull's concerns, noting that-given the kinds of charges that are often the subject of incompetency-status inquiries and insanity defenses 29 1 -it is inevitable that this population would wind up imprisoned in facilities in which multiple salient articles of the CRPD would be violated, with impunity, on a daily basis, and in which this group of individuals would suffer the wrath of sanism-inspired violence on the part of correctional staff and other prisoners. In short, I find nothing in the CRPD that requires the abolition of the insanity defense or the incompetency status. Rather, I believe that when that document is read as a whole-side by side with other international human-rights conventions and covenants that require fair trials-it calls out for the retention of these doctrines. The inevitable alternatives-consigning this population to the brutality of prisons-are unspeakable. To return once more to the song lyric with which I began my title, do we seriously believe that, had Abraham followed God's call, he should have been consigned to prison for the rest of his life? In his definitive encyclopedia on Dylan's music, Oliver Trager refers to Highway 61 Revisited as a 287. See, e.g 
291.
See supra note 164 (noting the proportion of insanity cases that involved death of the victim).
"scathing, crystalline depiction of a modern-age nightmare." 29 2 Trager certainly is right about the song, and I believe that this description equally fits any depiction of the treatment of persons with mental disabilities in prison. The disability-rights community cannot, in good conscience, encourage the growth of that nightmare. TJ demands that it be rejected.
292. TRAGER, supra note 41, at 252.
